On March 24, 2025, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) declaring that any country purchasing oil from Venezuela, “whether directly from Venezuela or indirectly through third parties,” will pay a 25% tariff on their exports to the United States.  The EO tasks the Secretary of Commerce with determining whether a country buys Venezuelan oil.

Referencing the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), President Trump explains in the EO that the 25% tariff is necessary to thwart “Venezuela’s ongoing destabilizing actions, including its support for illicit activities, [which] necessitate further economic measures to protect United States interests.”  According to the EO, the tariff “will be supplemental to duties on imports already imposed pursuant to IEEPA, section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1964, or any other authority.”

The 25% will take effect on April 2, 2025—the same day Trump is expected to implement a variety of tariff strategies based on reports he is set to receive April 1, 2025, from various trade-adjacent departments and agencies pursuant to his “America First Trade Policy.”  (For background on the “American First Trade Policy,” see Update of January 22, 2025.)  However, “the tariff…shall expire 1 year after the last date on which the country imported Venezuelan oil, or at an earlier date if the Secretary of Commerce…so determinates[.]”

According to a 2024 report and 2023 report by Reuters, China is the largest purchaser of Venezuelan oil; other major buyers include Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, European countries, India, and Panama.  By comparison, the data show the United States is the second-largest purchaser, though the amount bought is expected to decline after the Trump administration announced the winding down of a general license permitting a major U.S. company to transact with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company (see Update of March 25, 2025).

On March 24, 2025, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela General License (GL) 41B extending the expiration date of Venezuela GL 41, which authorized certain transactions related to Chevron Corporation’s joint ventures in Venezuela.  Previously, under GL 41A issued earlier this month, all transactions “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions” were permissible until 12:01 a.m. EDT, April 3, 2025 (see Update of March 5, 2025).  GL 41B is identical to GL 41A but only extends all such wind down transactions until 12:01 a.m. EDT, March 27, 2025.  After that date, transactions previously authorized under GL 41 will be prohibited.

UPDATE: On March 24, 2025, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a message noting the release of an updated list of impacted HTSUS codes covering “energy” and “energy resources” from Canada that are now subject to 10% tariffs since March 4, 2025. The list now specifically includes all crude and crude mixtures along with others. This post has been updated accordingly and provides a link to the current spreadsheet listing the applicable commodities and the relevant HTSUS codes.

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On March 19, 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued guidance regarding the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) codes covering “energy” and “energy resources” from Canada that are now subject to 10% tariffs since March 4, 2025, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).   See Thompson Hine Updates of March 4, 2025 and March 6, 2025.  CBP’s guidance confirms that the terms “energy” and “energy resources”, as defined in Executive Order (EO) 14156 of January 20, 2025 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency), apply and expressly include “crude oil, natural gas, lease condensates, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, uranium, coal, biofuels, geothermal heat, the kinetic movement of flowing water, and critical minerals, as defined by 30 U.S.C. 1606 (a)(3).”

CBP’s guidance continues to note that energy and energy resources qualifying for USMCA are not subject to the additional tariffs.  However, since the original notices regarding the scope of these definitions, numerous interpretative questions have been raised, particularly concerning the downstream scope of “natural gas liquids”, “refined petroleum products”, “biofuels” and “critical minerals.”  In response, CBP has provided a spreadsheet listing the applicable commodities and the relevant HTSUS codes. Styled Energy and Energy Resources from Canada Subject to Additional Duties Pursuant to Executive Order, the spreadsheetidentifies more than 150 critical minerals and related compounds classified under HTSUS Chapters 25-29, 32, 36 and 38.  The list also identifies more than 500 types of platinum, steel, aluminum, tin, platinum, nickel, titanium and other metal articles classified under HTSUS Chapters 71-76, 78-81 and 85.  Many of these products are used in the energy sector (e.g., pipelines) and mining sector (e.g., rails) and have been included in the recently imposed 25% Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs. See Thompson Hine Update of March 12, 2025.

The spreadsheet includes numerous “energy” or “energy resources” line items such as “coal”, “natural gas”, “biodiesel”, “uranium” and co- or by-products such as benzene under HTSUS Chapters 27 and Chapter 28.  The CBP guidance plainly indicates that “[e]nergy or energy resources of Canada, as defined by HTSUS 9903.01.13, include, but are not limited to, goods classified under the HTSUS subheadings in the attached spreadsheet.” (Emphasis added.)  As a result, based on a plain reading of the guidance, it remains possible that additional HTSUS codes could be included in the definition of the “energy” and “energy resources”, as defined in all related Executive Orders and notices, and covered by the 10% IEEPA tariffs. 

Critical Mineral Production

As noted, CBP’s guidance also includes certain “critical minerals” under the 10% IEEPA tariffs, following the use of that term as defined in Executive Order 14156.  This would appear to be supported by the issuance of an Executive Order on March 20, 2025 by President Donald Trump addressing critical minerals, as defined by 30 U.S.C. 1606(a)(3), “as well as uranium, copper, potash, gold, and any other element, compound or material as determined by the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC).”  Some, but not all, of these critical minerals are included in the CBP spreadsheet. 

Pursuant to the March 20, 2025 Executive Order, President Trump stated that “[o]ur national and economic security are now acutely threatened by our reliance upon hostile foreign powers’ mineral production.  It is imperative for our national security that the United States take immediate action to facilitate domestic mineral production to the maximum possible extent.”  Under this Executive Order, the Chair of the NEDC is to identify and establish mineral production projects for expedited review and to solicit industry feedback on regulatory bottlenecks and other recommended strategies for expediting domestic mineral production.  The Secretary of the Interior has been tasked with identifying all federal lands known to hold mineral deposits and reserves and to prioritize mineral production and mining-related purposes as the primary land uses in these areas, consistent with applicable law.  The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and the Interior are to identify “as many sites as possible on Federal land managed by their respective agencies that may be suitable for leasing or development pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2667, 42 U.S.C. 7256, or other applicable authorities, for the construction and operation of private commercial mineral production enterprises.”  In doing so, they are to provide a list prioritizing sites “on which mineral production projects could be fully permitted and operational as soon as possible and have the greatest potential effect on robustness of the domestic mineral supply chain.”

The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued Federal Register notices announcing that interested parties may submit written comments, data or other information pertinent to these investigations. Comments are due no later than April 1, 2025.

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Copper

This investigation was initiated on February 25, 2025 (see Thompson Hine Update of February 25, 2025). BIS Issued a Notice on March 13, 2025 announcing that it was seeking public comments. BIS is particularly interested in comments addressing the following: (i) the current and projected demand for copper in U.S. defense, energy, and critical infrastructure sectors; (ii) the extent to which domestic production, smelting, refining, and recycling can meet demand; (iii) the role of foreign supply chains, particularly from major exporters, in meeting U.S. demand; (iv) the concentration of U.S. copper imports from a small number of suppliers and the associated risks; (v) the impact of foreign government subsidies, overcapacity, and predatory trade practices on U.S. industry competitiveness; (vi) the economic impact of artificially suppressed copper prices due to dumping and state-sponsored overproduction; (vii) the potential for export restrictions by foreign nations, including the ability of foreign nations to weaponize their control over refined copper supplies; (viii) the feasibility of increasing domestic copper mining, smelting, and refining capacity to reduce import reliance; and (ix) the impact of current trade policies on domestic copper production and whether additional measures, including tariffs or quotas, are necessary to protect national security. Comments must be submitted via the Federal rulemaking portal at: www.regulations.gov. The Docket ID no. for this notice is BIS– 2025–0010, and submitters must refer to X–RIN 0694– XC116 in all comments.

Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Timber and Lumber

This investigation was initiated on March 1, 2025 (see Thompson Hine Update of March 3, 2025). BIS issued a Notice on March 13, 2025 announcing that it was seeking public comments. BIS is particularly interested in comments addressing the following: (i) the current and projected demand for timber and lumber in the United States; (ii) the extent to which domestic production of timber and lumber can meet domestic demand; (iii) the role of foreign supply chains, particularly of major exporters, in meeting U.S. timber and lumber demand; (iv) the impact of foreign government subsidies and predatory trade practices on U.S. timber, lumber, and derivative product industry competitiveness; (v) the feasibility of increasing domestic timber and lumber capacity to reduce imports; (vi) the impact of current trade policies on domestic timber, lumber, and derivative product production, and whether additional measures, including tariffs or quotas, are necessary to protect national security; and (vii) any other relevant factors. Comments must be submitted via the Federal rulemaking portal at: www.regulations.gov. The Docket ID no. for this notice is BIS– 2025–0011, and submitters must refer to X–RIN 0694– XC117 in all comments.

As previously announced by President Donald Trump, the Section 232 steel and aluminum 25% ad valorem tariffs went into effect 12:01 a.m., March 12, 2025, against all steel and aluminum articles and all listed derivatives, including many automotive, construction and consumer products. Aluminum articles and their derivative products from Russia are subject to 200% tariffs. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) guidance confirms that “melted and poured” / “smelted and cast” reporting is due for all steel and aluminum articles and their derivative products. All existing tariff rate quotas and general/country exclusions have been terminated as of March 11, 2025. Currently, there is no process for interested U.S. parties to seek new product exclusion requests, and all currently-in-force product exclusions will end as of their end date or when quotas are reached. These Section 232 tariffs are in addition to any other imposed duties or tariffs, including the recent IEEPA tariffs imposed against China, Mexico and Canada. 

Updated CBP guidance can be found on the Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS): 

  1. CSMS # 64384496 – UPDATED GUIDANCE: Import Duties on Imports of Aluminum and Aluminum Derivative Products
  2. CSMS # 64384423 – UPDATED GUIDANCE: Import Duties on Imports of Steel and Steel Derivative Products
  3. CSMS # 64375535 – Quota Guidance: Proclamation 10896 of February 10, 2025, Adjusting Imports of Steel and Aluminum into the United States

For additional background on these new tariffs on imported steel and aluminum articles and their derivative products from all countries, see Thompson Hine Updates of February 12, 2025 and February 14, 2025.

As expected, Canada and the European Union (EU) responded with countermeasures and retaliatory tariffs. The EU announced a two-step approach: (1) the end of the suspension of existing 2018 and 2020 countermeasures against the United States on April 1, 2025; and (2) a package of new countermeasures on U.S. exports to enter into force by mid-April 2025, following the consultation of EU member states and stakeholders. Canada responded with a “dollar-for-dollar” approach with 25% retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods worth approximately $21 billion. The package of Canadian countermeasures is effective as of March 13, 2025. Canada also announced that these U.S. tariffs violate U.S. obligations under both the USMCA and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement and that it will be seeking consultations with the United States as a first step in any dispute settlement under these agreements. Mexico has indicated that it may delay any retaliatory measures until April 2, 2025, when President Trump has indicated the United States will impose separate reciprocal tariffs, “to see if we also need to take some actions.”

Thompson Hine LLP’s International Trade practice group members continue to monitor these fluid and changing tariffs measures and will continue to report any significant developments.

On March 3, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) delivered President Donald Trump’s 2025 Trade Policy Agenda, 2024 Annual Report, and World Trade Organization at Thirty report to Congress. This year’s trade agenda seeks to strengthen the middle class and national defense and to address trade deficits by focusing on a “Production Economy” and implementing an “America First” approach in trade relations.

2024 Annual Report

The 2024 Annual Report provides a comprehensive overview of U.S. trade agreements, negotiations, and enforcement activities. It covers various trade initiatives, preference programs, and bilateral and multilateral engagements involving the United States and numerous countries. Specifically, the USTR in 2024 was actively involved in various trade agreements and negotiations, including (1) the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), (2) the United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade, (3) the United States–Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership, and (4) the African Continental Free Trade Area Memorandum of Understanding. As in past years, the report notes that the United States continued to urge other countries to provide adequate IP protection and enforcement, addressing issues like copyright piracy, counterfeit products, and trade secret theft. The USTR also engaged with different countries to address issues like labor rights and improved enforcement of laws affecting labor, the environment, and agriculture.

2025 Trade Policy Agenda

The agenda outlines President Trump’s vision for addressing the economic and national security challenges facing the United States and follows the America First Trade Policy Presidential Memorandum released on his first day in office on January 20, 2025 (see Thompson Hine Update of January 22, 2025). This includes investigating the causes of the trade deficit, identifying unfair trade practices, and using leverage to open new markets for U.S. exports. The agenda emphasizes the need for a rebalanced trade policy that prioritizes American interests, focusing on a production-based economy to increase manufacturing jobs and the share of manufacturing in the gross domestic product (GDP).

A significant component of the agenda is the emphasis on trade agreements and an effort to “ensure that they help raise wages and grow our industrial base.” The agenda underscores the importance of reviewing existing trade agreements to ensure they operate in the national interest and do not allow third countries to benefit unfairly. The agenda calls for a thorough review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to “assess the impact of the USMCA on American workers, farmers, ranchers, service providers, and other businesses” in preparation for the mandated review of the agreement in July 2026.

The agenda places a strong focus on U.S. trade relations with China, “the single biggest source of [the U.S.] large and persistent trade deficit”. In doing so, it highlights the need to enforce the Phase One Agreement, which addresses critical issues related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The USTR is tasked with assessing China’s compliance with the agreement and responding to additional unfair practices. This strategic approach aims to address the structural challenges distorting the global trading system, ultimately supporting U.S. workers, businesses, and national security. By taking a vigorous stance on trade enforcement, the agenda seeks to counter China’s non-market policies and practices, ensuring a level playing field for U.S. industries and promoting fair competition in the global market.

WTO at Thirty and U.S. Interests

The USTR’s Annual Report also includes a section on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its effects on the interests of the United States, including “the costs and benefits to the United States of its participation in the WTO, and the value of the continued participation of the United States in the WTO.” This section of the report emphasizes that the WTO, established in 1995, has faced significant challenges in fulfilling its mission of promoting open, market-oriented policies and reducing trade barriers, particularly in addressing the non-market policies and practices of major economies like China. It argues that the dispute settlement system, especially the Appellate Body, has been criticized for overreach and creating new obligations beyond the agreed rules, undermining national sovereignty and the effectiveness of the WTO’s monitoring and enforcement functions. Despite these challenges, the United States remains committed to seeking reforms that can restore the WTO’s relevance and effectiveness. Achieving “meaningful reform” will require the active participation and cooperation of all WTO members, “including those that have benefited from the failure of the WTO to fulfill its objectives”.

In sum, the discussion on the WTO reflects an approach by the Trump administration to enhancing American economic interests, ensuring fair trade practices, and promoting national security. By focusing on rebalancing trade agreements, enforcing existing commitments, and advocating for meaningful reforms within the WTO, the administration aims to create a new global trading environment. These efforts are designed to support U.S. workers, middle class, businesses, and industries.

A press release outlining other key highlights of the report is available here. For an overview of the most recent past Annual Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report, see Thompson Hine Update of March 5, 2024.

On March 6, 2025, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License (GL) 5R, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After July 3, 2025,” which continues to delay U.S. persons’ ability to enforce bondholder rights to the CITGO shares serving as collateral for the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) 2020 8.5% bond until on or after July 3, 2025. The previous deadline had been March 7, 2025. Effective March 6, this General License replaces GL 5Q.

With this revised General License, U.S. persons remain prohibited from engaging in any transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5% Bond unless specifically authorized by OFAC. In FAQ 595, OFAC continues to note a favorable licensing policy toward those seeking to apply for a specific license in an effort to reach an agreement on proposals to “restructure or refinance payments due to the holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5% bond.” 

President Donald Trump issued two executive orders (“EOs”) on March 6, 2025 delaying the 25% tariffs imposed against imports of products of Canada and Mexico (10% tariffs for imports of energy products of Canada) pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) until April 2, 2025.  The EOs specifically provide that goods qualifying and entered for preferential treatment under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”), as provided in General Note 11 of the Harmonized Tariffs Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), will not be subject to the previously issued IEEPA tariffs until April 2, 2025.  The EOs apply to all such goods entered on or after 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard Time on March 7, 2025.   As a result:

  1. USMCA-qualifying goods will not be subject to the additional IEEPA tariffs at the time of entry from March 7, 2025 through April 2, 2025.   
  2. USMCA-originating goods entered from March 4, 2025 through March 6, 2025 (i.e., three days) remain subject to the IEEPA tariffs. 
  3. All goods that do not meet the USMCA requirements will remain subject to the IEEPA tariffs from March 4, 2025. 
  4. Additionally, IEEPA tariffs on non-USMCA originating potash, a product typically used in fertilizer production, will be reduced to 10% effective March 7, 2025.  

The EOs and White House Fact Sheets can be found here: Amendment to Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border – The White House; Amendment to Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Southern Border – The White House; and Fact Sheet;  and President Donald J. Trump Adjusts Tariffs on Canada and Mexico to Minimize Disruption to the Automotive Industry .

The EOs indicate that the suspension until April 2, 2025 serves “to minimize disruption to the United States automotive industry,” which they describe as “a major source of United States employment and innovation and is integral to United States economic and national security.”  While the automotive sector is cited as the rationale, the delay until April 2, 2025 applies to all USMCA-qualifying goods.

For non-originating USMCA goods, the IEEPA tariffs on Canada, EO 14193 (Feb. 1, 2025), remain a 10% ad valorem tariff on all non-USMCA-originating energy products of Canada, and a 25% ad valorem tariff on all other non-USMCA-originating products of Canada.  Likewise, IEEP tariffs on Mexico, EO 14194 (Feb. 1, 2025), remain a 25% ad valorem tariff on all non-USMCA-originating products of Mexico.  (For more background information on both EOs, see Update of March 4, 2025.)

Approximately 50% of the imports entering the United States from Mexico and 38% of the imports from Canada claim USMCA preferential treatment.  A significant amount of non-USMCA-originating products from the two countries include energy resources, which typically claim preferential treatment at a later time.  However, the U.S. General Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently determined that $16.5 billion of U.S. imports of automotive vehicles and $53 billion of imports of automotive parts do not claim USMCA preferential treatment — GAO-24-106330, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: USTR Should Improve Coordination on New Automotive Rules of Origin. For automotive vehicles, this is a significant increase from $1.1 billion in the pre-USMCA period, with the overwhelming majority of automotive imports not using USMCA-preferential treatment coming from Mexico.  These goods typically use the 2.5% most favored nation (“MFN”) rate, which must now be added to the IEEPA tariffs.   

The White House has made no announcement as to the status of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs scheduled to enter into effect on March 12, 2025 (with tariffs on new steel and aluminum derivative products to be announced at potentially a later time).   April 2, 2025 marks the planned launch date for President Trump’s broad-based reciprocal tariff plan.

On March 4, 2025, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 41A within its Venezuela-Related Sanctions Program: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela.” The Biden Administration had issued the precursor to General License (GL) 41A, GL 41, on November 26, 2022, to permit Chevron Corporation’s joint ventures with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) or any entity owned 50% or more by PdVSA, whether directly or indirectly, to operate in Venezuela. PdVSA is Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company. (For more background on GL 41, see Thompson Hine Update of November 28, 2022.) OFAC’s issuance of GL 41A comes a few days after President Donald Trump stated his administration would be “reversing the concessions” of GL 41, arguing Venezuela’s leadership has made insufficient progress on reforming the “[e]lectoral conditions within Venezuela” and on “the rapid pace that they had agreed to” accept migrant returns from the United States.

Under the conditions set forth in GL 41A, all transactions “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions” are permissible until 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 3, 2025. Thereafter, transactions previously authorized under GL 41 will be prohibited.

Key Notes:

  • The USTR issued a determination and report in January 2025 finding that China’s acts, policies, and practices of in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors burden or restrict U.S. commerce and are actionable under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
  • The USTR is proposing actions that could include significant port service fees and restrictions on services to promote the transport of U.S. goods on U.S. vessels.
  • If implemented, such actions would likely lead to higher shipping costs and trigger supply chain disruptions.
  • Public comments on the proposed actions will be accepted until March 24, 2025.

On February 21, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced its proposed actions in response to an earlier determination finding China was targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance. This determination followed an investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. This bulletin summarizes the investigation and highlights the proposed actions the USTR is considering submitting to President Donald Trump. 

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